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Social Reporting in the Tobacco Industry: 
All Smoke and Mirrors? 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the process of social reporting as a proactive 
management strategy to bridge the divide between the social and the economic. In 
July 2002 British American Tobacco launched their first social report coinciding with 
the release of the World Health Organisation’s Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control. A case study, utilizing textual analysis of publicly available documents 
examined through a legitimacy perspective, was used to explore this issue. This paper 
asserts that the process, guidelines and assurance employed by British American 
Tobacco for its social report is a management strategy to enter the contested domain 
of public policy. Since this research is limited to British American Tobacco’s 
2001/2002 Social Report and supporting documents, further research could include 
interviews with key players or a longitudinal study to compare and contrast the social 
reporting practices of BAT over time. The tobacco industry has been heavily 
criticised and is now facing control via global regulation. In this context the World 
Health Organisation, as a multi-lateral body exercising regulatory powers, extends the 
notion of stakeholders that have the potential to exert pressure on the ‘legitimacy’ of 
an organisation. 
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Introduction 
Developments in health and public awareness, litigation, regulation and the release of 
damaging internal documents pointing to questionable ethical behaviour all confirm 
the increasing social and financial pressure on the tobacco industry (Social Investment 
Forum, 1998). Contributing to the negative public image is the regressive effect the 
industry has on global poverty (Garnaut, 2002). Accordingly, in the burgeoning area 
of ethical or socially responsible investing, many funds explicitly prohibit holdings in 
firms that operate in the tobacco industry (Kreander et al, 2002). These pressures have 
created a ‘legitimacy gap’, providing a significant motivation for organisational 
legitimation within the tobacco industry.  In what some believe to be an attempt to 
redefine the company as “responsible” (Burton and Rowell, 2002, p. 6) British 
American Tobacco (BAT), a multinational corporation involved in tobacco 
production, cigarette manufacture and marketing, delivered its first social report in 
July 2002.  
 
Another source of concern for the tobacco industry is the proposed Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) developed by the World Health Organization 
(WHO). It aims to set international standards on such issues as tobacco production, 
advertising, marketing and prevention of smuggling. In that context, a spokesman for 
the civil society group Action on Smoking and Health, is quoted as saying 
 
British American Tobacco sees the Framework Convention as a 
threat to its growing markets in developing countries. It is 
determined to derail it, delay it and sabotage it in any possible way 
it can (in Burton and Rowell, 2002, p. 6) 
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Prior research has identified various ‘relevant publics’ (Lindblom, 1993), which bring 
pressure at the nexus between an organisation and its operating environment (Neu et 
al, 1998; O’Donovan, 2002; Tilt, 1994). These range from, but are not limited to, 
investors, potential investors, lobby groups and regulatory agencies (Tilt, 1994; 
Deegan and Rankin; 1997; Buhr, 1998). The pressure to improve social and 
environmental performance or meet expectations can be applied through the legal 
system (Buhr, 1998). This paper addresses the external pressure from a multi-lateral 
organisation exercising its regulatory powers. Through the exercise of these powers, 
WHO has the capacity to engage the tobacco industry in the public arena, and force 
the industry to address the issues surrounding their products. Social reporting, as a 
proactive management strategy, is one response to this threat. The neutrality of 
corporate communications has been challenged on the grounds that the contents are 
largely determined by and reflect management beliefs (Buhr, 1998). As well as pre-
empting and subverting attempts to regulate the industry globally, the process of 
social reporting has the potential to legitimate the industry and improve its image. In 
an effort to deflect criticism, BAT has undertaken an audited process of stakeholder 
engagement for their voluntary social disclosures. 
 
In the field of corporate social reporting (CSR) there have been attempts to theorise 
the motivational aspects for the production of voluntary social reports. These various 
theoretical approaches and their applicability to BAT and its social report aptly 
demonstrate managerial tactics. Legitimacy theory has been used to critique and 
expose the inherent paradox of the tobacco industry, producing a product with 
questionable positive outcomes and reporting as a ‘good corporate citizen’.  
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Description and analysis of the BAT Social Report 2001/2002 and the process of 
stakeholder engagement is worthy of close scrutiny. 
The Mirror: Theoretical Perspective  
To place CSR in a theoretical context, several broad, overlapping groups of theories 
concerning information flows between organisations and society have been used 
(Gray et al, 1995). This paper utilises a perspective from the social and political 
theory studies, legitimacy theory. Full discussion of the contributions from the other 
groups is not within the ambit of this work and may be found elsewhere (see e.g. 
Cooper and Sherer, 1984; Deegan, 2002; Gray et al, 1995; Gray, 2002; Tilt, 1994; 
Tinker et al, 1991). 
 
Social and political theories that focus on the role of information and disclosure in the 
relationships between organisations, the state, individuals and groups are most 
appropriate in explaining CSR. Political economy theory places an emphasis on the 
inter-relationships between political and economic forces in society and recognises 
the effects of accounting reports on the distribution of income, power and wealth 
(Cooper and Sherer, 1984). This perspective also “accepts that society, politics, and 
economics are inseparable so that issues, such as economic issues, cannot be 
considered in isolation from social and environmental issues” (Blomquist and 
Deegan, 2000, p. 7). It recognises a pluralistic set of recipients of CSR information, 
who are considered to be in constant conflict, reflecting the amount of power they 
wield in society (Puxty, 1986). Social accounting can be considered a reflection of 
social conflicts occurring “between capital and other social interests (e.g. 
environmentalists, workers, consumers, women, minorities)” (Tinker et al, 1991, p. 
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46-47). A  power elite that emerges sets the agenda for maintaining control through 
the accounting process (Buhr, 1998). Accounting systems, of which CSR is part, act 
to “create, distribute and mystify power” (Buhr, 1998, p. 165). This “radical paradigm 
suggests that society reflects the basic organizing principles and institutional 
structures within it (i.e. the capitalist structure)” (Tilt, 1994, p. 49).  Yet, the paradigm 
does not necessarily subscribe to the view that this nature of society and its structures 
are socially desirable (Hopper and Powell, 1985). 
 
From social and political theories, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory have 
developed. These theories are similar and essentially derived from the broader 
political economy theory (Gray et al, 1996; Deegan, 2002). While there are 
differences between stakeholder and legitimacy theory, they both focus attention on 
the nexus between the organisation and its operating environment (Neu et al, 1998.). 
This environment at the micro-level is engagement with identified stakeholders, 
suggesting a stakeholder approach. At the micro-level legitimacy theory also deals 
with stakeholders, and acknowledges heterogeneity and conflict, but it also operates at 
a macro or conceptual level, presenting stakeholders in the broader social context. At 
this conceptual or abstract level, legitimacy theory deals with perceptions and the 
processes involved in redefining or sustaining those perceptions and can 
accommodate notions of power relationships and discourses at a global level. 
 
Stakeholder theory recognises the dynamic and complex relationships between 
organisations and their stakeholders and that these relationships involve responsibility 
and accountability (Gray et al, 1996). “Stakeholder analysis enables identification of 
those societal interest groups to whom the business might be considered accountable, 
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and therefore to whom an adequate account of its activities would be deemed 
necessary” (Woodward and Woodward, 2001, p.1). Therefore, CSR could be 
considered as part of a ‘contractual’ relationship between organisational stakeholders 
(Cooper and Sherer, 1984, p. 212).  
 
Legitimacy theory posits that organisations are continually seeking to ensure that they 
operate with the bounds and norms of their respective societies (Blomquist and 
Deegan, 2000). To this end, they attempt to establish congruence between “the social 
values associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable 
behaviour in the larger social system of which they are part” (Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975, p. 122). Consistent with that, Richardson (1987, p. 352) asserts accounting is a 
legitimating institution and provides a “means by which social values are linked to 
economic actions”. It is perceived that an organisation may employ ‘legitimation’ 
strategies when faced with a threat to its legitimacy (Lindblom, 1993). Organisational 
legitimacy can thus be constructed through the use of symbols or symbolic action 
communicating a ‘public image’ (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). This image may be in 
line with the primary goals, methods of operation or output of the organisation (Neu 
et al, 1998). Issues concerning legitimacy, raised in society, are addressed in the 
public policy arena as it is not restricted to the realm of the market system. Thus, 
social disclosures influence the public policy process directly and indirectly through 
the communication of corporate or industry information. 
 
At the micro-level stakeholder theory is primarily concerned with how an 
organisation manages its stakeholders (Gray et al, 1997). While this would provide 
interesting insights into the social reporting practices of BAT, the purpose of this 
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work is to expose BAT’s strategy of using an accounting discourse, social reporting, 
to enhance organisational legitimacy.  This occurs by attempting to alter or re-orient 
perceptions of the organisation and the industry and construct an image. Therefore, 
legitimacy theory is the appropriate theoretical perspective.  
Roll Your Own – Method 
The method adopted for examination and analysis of BAT’s Social Report is a case-
study utilising textual analysis. Since this research is concerned with the processes 
involved in redefining or sustaining perceptions, there is no necessity to enter the 
contested domain of stakeholders. Competing texts beyond annual reporting 
(Campbell et al, 2003) provide the basis of the analysis. A case study allows for 
investigating a contemporary phenomenon in context when the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and the context are blurred and multiple sources of evidence are 
employed (Yin, 1989). Publicly available documents constituted the data for research. 
They included, but not are confined to, BAT Social Report 2001/2002, media releases 
from BAT chairman, Martin Broughton and information available on the BAT 
website. This research centred on the image or particular ‘spin’ (Everett, 2002) that 
was conveyed in these public documents. This strategy of the organisation is explored 
by using sources that demonstrate how BAT represents itself to society at large. 
Further research could include interviews with key players using a stakeholder 
perspective or a longitudinal study to compare and contrast the social reporting 
practices of BAT over time. 
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Smoke in Your Eyes? 
British American Tobacco 
The origins of the United Kingdom based corporation, British American Tobacco p.l.c 
can be traced back to 1902. After one hundred years and the global spread of the 
tobacco industry, BAT has emerged as a major player with over fifteen percent 
market share in tobacco and tobacco-related products. This involvement includes 
‘doing business’ in 180 countries, controlling 250,000 tobacco farmers, running 84 
factories in 64 countries and employing 85,000 people globally. From direct and 
indirect tax, governments are estimated to gather £14 billion annually (BAT, 
2002(a)). As well as its stated economic benefits, BAT (2002 (b)) also maintain it 
…transfer[s] world class technology, management know-how and 
international best practices in areas such as quality, environment, health 
and safety protection, employment and corporate governance. 
 
BAT concedes that apart from the positive economic, technical and ethical 
dimensions of the organisation, tobacco products carry real health risks for those who 
choose to smoke (BAT, 2002(a)) and impacts public health (Broughton, 2001, p. 4). 
As such, BAT publicly supports regulation to reduce this health impact including such 
initiatives as public information, marketing to prevent youth smoking and sales, 
tougher action on counterfeiting and public and workplace policies. But, BAT 
management argues that there is no compelling proof that environmental tobacco 
smoke (passive smoking) is harmful, but merely an irritant (BAT, 2002 (a)). It openly 
supports the ‘right to smoke’ argument, based on the broader neo-liberal view, 
embracing the freedom of the market and the right of individuals to make an informed 
choice about a legal product. 
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Where there’s Smoke 
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control  
On the 24th May 1999 the World Health Assembly (WHA), the governing body of the 
WHO, unanimously backed a resolution to commence work on the FCTC. A 
framework convention is a legal treaty or international agreement between states in 
written form and governed by international law. This agreement outlines the general 
stated objectives of the FCTC in relation to health-related and other tobacco issues, 
which are supplemented by protocols. These protocols are treaties, or separate 
agreements, entailing more specific legal obligations (WHO, 2000). The import of 
agreement to such a framework convention is not trivial. The Kyoto Protocol 
emanating from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is 
highly profiled because of its economic and social implications for member states. 
 
As an international, multilateral organisation WHO states that by bringing together its 
technical and public health expertise it has the ability to “circumscribe the global 
spread of tobacco and tobacco products” (WHO, 2000, p. 8). In general terms the 
broad objectives of the FCTC include: protecting children, adolescents and vulnerable 
communities from tobacco through their exposure to smoking and marketing; 
addressing the prevention and treatment of tobacco dependence; promoting a smoke-
free environment and tobacco-free economies (WHO, 2000). More specifically, WHO 
envisages that the protocols could address issues such as advertising, package design 
and labelling, environmental tobacco smoke, agricultural diversification and 
smuggling (WHO, 2000).  
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Smoking and tobacco related issues have a worldwide focus. The stated ultimate aim 
of WHO, through the FCTC, is to abrogate the social and health-related risks by the 
reduction of tobacco smoking globally. In so doing, there is recognition of the 
anticipated economic effects of tobacco control. In the short to medium term, WHO 
expects those economies relying heavily on tobacco exports will suffer until 
agricultural diversification is established. However, it argues, that the benefit in terms 
of decreased health and social costs will outweigh the direct economic benefits from 
tobacco cultivation in the long term (WHO, 2000). 
 
WHA has established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to negotiate the text of 
the FCTC and related protocols. This body is open to all WHO Member States, 
regional economic integration organisations and observers. The intended adoption of 
the FCTC is stated as being no later than May 2003 (WHO, 2000). At the time of 
writing, 47 states have become signatories[1], indicating political support and a 
commitment to abide by the principles until ratification (WHO, 2003). 
 
‘Chain’ Smoking -  Linking BAT & FCTC 
In 2001, BAT in collaboration with other tobacco companies, launched the voluntary 
international minimum Marketing Standards (BAT, 2001). According to its Chairman 
this initiative “raises the bar” in terms of advertising, packaging and sponsorship 
(Broughton, 2001, p. 4). In 2002 BAT produced its first Social Report in an attempt to 
provide “broader accountability to stakeholders” and to present “clear evidence of a 
socially responsible tobacco company” (BAT, 2002 (a), p.1). At this point it is worth 
noting the interesting time line of events. In 1999, WHA introduced measures to 
significantly curb the increase of tobacco use worldwide and the tobacco industry 
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within two years introduced its own standards and BAT repositioned itself to appear a 
‘transparent’ and responsible corporate citizen.  
 
It is worth contemplating why a tobacco company has voluntarily produced an 
expensive[2], extensive social report when in less than a year mandatory standards 
will evolve under the FCTC. According to BAT, the ultimate question for 
stakeholders is, who would they prefer to manage the tobacco industry? BAT posits 
the options as either the legitimate well-run responsible tobacco industry or organised 
crime, counterfeiters and back-door salesman, likely to flourish under the new 
framework (Broughton, 2001). The management of BAT are, however, in agreement 
with some of the aspirations of the WHO initiative, but question the appropriateness 
of a global health organisation to properly address the issues surrounding the whole 
tobacco debate. Much of this debate centres on proprietary rights and the commercial 
secrets implication of full product disclosure. The WHO, according to BAT, has not 
engaged the tobacco industry as an important player and has excluded it from the 
FCTC negotiations (BAT, 2001). BAT contests the validity of data and the method 
for calculating the future mortality statistics generated by WHO, as the basis for 
implementing the FCTC. Contesting those data and methods, also undermines the 
legitimacy of WHO and its objectives.  
 
The conflict and ensuing debate differentiates the ‘economic view’, which is the 
argument taken by the tobacco industry, and the ‘health or social view’ taken by 
WHO. This conflict is exacerbated in the Third World and developing countries in 
which issues surrounding economic development dominate health issues[3]. The 
consumption of cigarettes in the Third World is increasing through sophisticated mass 
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marketing and promotion (Sethi and Steidlmeier, 1997). Apart from the health issues 
there are problems of land degradation, deforestation and the shift away from food 
production to revenue producing tobacco crops (Sethi and Steidlmeier, 1997). As one 
of the most heavily taxed commodities, tobacco provides revenue from tax for 
governments, income to farmers, income to processors and foreign exchange (Sethi 
and Steidlmeier, 1997). BAT enters this debate by contesting the appropriateness of a 
‘one size fits all’ approach by WHO (BAT, 2002(b)) as a “clumsy imposition of first 
world solutions” threatening self-determination and an example of moral and cultural 
imperialism (Broughton, 2001, p. 2). BAT further expands the argument to capture 
the World Bank’s alignment with WHO as the ‘dark side’ of globalisation and an 
abuse of power (Broughton, 2001). Although we may agree with these sentiments, the 
championing voice of a multinational corporation relying on an overtly dangerous 
product for economic survival is questionable in the extreme. 
 
The global tobacco industry is considered by BAT to be indispensable in terms of 
employment and taxation revenue (Broughton, 2001). And, tobacco industry 
regulation has broader implications. For example, there are significant concerns 
regarding smuggling and other illegal activities, agricultural issues such as 
biodiversity, chemical use and deforestation, as well as health issues, which WHO 
seeks to address through the FCTC. The central issue in the regulation debate is 
whether the tobacco industry can self-regulate through industry standards and 
corporate social reporting, and encompass not only the economic, but also the social 
and political aspects of the debate. BAT’s initial social reporting process is thus 
worthy of close analysis. 
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Smoke Rings - The Reporting Process 
British American Tobacco’s Social Report 2001/2002 is a one hundred and fifty six 
page glossy magazine-style publication. It is available in hard copy as well as from 
the company web-site. According to British American Tobacco, 
[W]e have adopted social reporting to help us to embed the principles of 
Corporate Social Reporting (CSR) within the Group, to meet greater 
demands for corporate transparency and to continue improving our 
management decision-making through sensitivity to changing 
expectations in society. (BAT, 2002(a), p. 9) 
 
In the first cycle of reporting thirteen countries were included in the process 
representing the five geographical regions (BAT, 2002 (a), p. 9) (see Appendix 1). 
BAT used the AA1000 (see below) as a standard to guide the process of stakeholder 
engagement, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines provided the format and 
content for the report and Bureau Veritas performed the external audit. We take these 
seriatum. 
 
AccountAbility1000 (AA1000) 
The AA1000 framework was established by the Institute of Social and Ethical 
Accountability (ISEA or AccountAbility) as a means of improving accountability and 
performance through a process of learning through stakeholder engagement (ISEA, 
p.15). The AA1000 is referred to as a framework as it includes a standard, a set of 
guidelines and professional qualification or audit process[4]. As such it can be used 
by organisations as a stand-alone framework for reporting, or as a process framework 
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for guiding stakeholder engagement using other social and ethical reporting 
indicators. In the case of BAT, the framework has been used to guide its stakeholder 
engagement process. Through this process certain areas and issues of concern were 
identified, followed by reporting using the GRI indicators of performance. Each of the 
13 representative countries appointed an independent facilitator who selected and 
contacted stakeholders for the engagement process (BAT, 2002(a)). Stakeholders 
have been defined by British American Tobacco as 
..any person or organisation on whom our business impacts or whose 
actions impact on us. Broadly this means governments, regulators, 
politicians, consumers; investors; employees; commercial and trade 
partners; scientific and medical community; local communities; welfare, 
family, education and religious groups; NGOs; campaigner/pressure 
groups (BAT, 2002(a), p.11) 
 
In the UK, of the one hundred and sixty seven stakeholders invited, thirty-four replied 
and attended the stakeholder engagement process (see Appendix 2). It has been 
suggested that health groups boycotted the process as a “public-relations mirage, 
completely devoid of substance” (Burton and Rowell, 2002, p. 6).   
 
The overarching objective of AA1000 is the notion of accountability. AccountAbility 
state that to account is to explain or justify to those people who have a legitimate 
interest. Thus, in order to discharge its accountability an organisation  
will account for its acts, omissions, risks and dependencies. However, in 
addition to this accounting requirement of transparency, accountability 
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also entails a broader obligation of responsiveness and compliance (ISEA, 
1999, p. 8) 
 
‘Responsiveness’, in this sense, is the capacity to support continuous improvement for 
organisational processes; ‘performance and compliance’ entails the duty to comply 
and report on agreed standards (ISEA, 1999). The stakeholder dialogue process 
identified issues and areas of concern, to which BAT responded. If these areas 
coincided with those already measured within the company group they were reported 
against the GRI. 
 
This notion of accountability as the overriding principle is supported by identifiable 
characteristics that can be used in the design of an organisation’s social and ethical 
accounting, auditing and reporting process (see Fig. 1) 
 
Take in Figure 1 
In the model, accountability is directly supported by the idea of inclusivity. Thus, at 
every stage of the process, inclusivity reflects the needs of stakeholders, including 
‘voiceless’ future generations and the environment. This stated, stakeholder 
engagement is designed to infuse the three broad  operational aspects of the standard. 
These principles are meant to identify the characteristics of a quality process and can 
therefore be used to design as well as assess the quality of stakeholder engagement 
(ISEA, 1999, p.10). 
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 The ‘standard’ component of AA1000 is a process not a substantive standard. As 
such it specifies the processes an organisation should follow to account for 
performance, not the levels an organisation should achieve (ISEA, 1999). To comply 
with the quality principles stated above, the process includes planning, accounting, 
auditing and reporting, embedded by virtue of a feedback loop. Thus, it is stated, the 
experience of the first cycle is integrated and therefore provides the opportunity for 
continuous improvement in the organisation’s activities. To assist stakeholders in 
making an assessment of inclusion of information in a report and its meaning, a set of 
guidelines is included. The guidelines provide information for both internal and 
external auditing requirements.  
 
Global Reporting Initiative 
The AA1000 guidelines and standard do not provide a definitive guide to the format 
or contents of social and ethical reports, nor do they define performance or calculate a 
score. Therefore the AA1000 framework allows the integration of other reporting 
guidelines for these purposes, such as the GRI’s sustainability guidelines (ISEA, 
1999). 
 
In 1997 the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies in partnership with 
the United Nations Environment Programme convened the Global Reporting Initiative 
to produce global guidelines for voluntary reporting on the economic, environmental 
and social dimensions of organisational activities. In 2000[5] these guidelines were 
published providing a reporting framework recommending topics and indicators of 
performance (BAT, 2002(a)) (see Appendix 3).  
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The GRI guidelines of performance are structured in a hierarchy comprising of 
organisation specific categories, aspects and indicators. The categories are grouped 
under the conventional, three broad areas of economic, environment and social 
dimensions of sustainability, plus a fourth dimension. This fourth dimension of 
information is organisation specific indicators based on consultation with stakeholders 
(GRI, 2000). These indicators are considered to be experimental and embryonic and 
are reported as systemic or cross-cutting. Systemic indicators link performance at the 
micro-level (organisation) with the macro-level (national, regional etc). Cross-cutting 
indicators traverse two or more of the sustainability elements (GRI, 2000). BAT 
reported against fifty percent of the GRI Social and Environmental Indicators (BAT, 
2002(a)) (see Appendix 4). The majority of reporting occurred in the area of 
environmental management. 
 
The GRI categories are operationalised by ‘aspects’. The indicators provide either a 
quantitative or qualitative measure of the aspect (GRI, 2000). Economic performance 
indicators are concerned with the organisation’s impact on the economic 
circumstances of stakeholders and includes, although not confined to, traditional 
financial accounting measures (GRI, 2000). Environmental indicators direct attention 
to the impact on living and non-living natural systems (GRI, 2000). These 
environmental indicators, following 20 years of experience, have evolved to include 
general and more advanced organisation-specific indicators (GRI, 2000). The social 
indicators hone in on an organisation’s impact on social systems. As an example of 
the hierarchy used, the ‘Social’ reporting dimension includes a category ‘Human 
Rights’, one aspect is ‘Indigenous Rights’, the indicators of the aspect include, 
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evidence of indigenous representation in decision-making and the number and cause 
of protests (GRI, 2000). 
 
Auditing: Bureau Veritas 
Bureau Veritas is an international organisation with five hundred offices world-wide. 
It provides an extensive range of specialised services in the areas of conformity 
assessment, consulting, training and outsourcing (Bureau Veritas, 2002). The 
independent verification of the social reporting process of BAT against the AA1000 is 
evidence of compliance with an external auditing requirement. This verification 
entails a monitoring of the organisation’s performance throughout the process, 
verifying dialogue summaries, stakeholder commentaries, responses, case studies and 
social performance data. Bureau Veritas designed a new method that included 
reducing the original AA1000 to a verifiable form and the building of a quantification 
tool, VeriSEAAR©. This assessment tool enabled a score or benchmark against three 
main stages of the reporting process; pre-stakeholder consultation, stakeholder 
consultation and post consultation (Bureau Veritas, 2002). The accuracy of reported 
information used established auditing techniques such as inspection of records and 
documents, internal and external enquiry, confirmation of information sources and 
accuracy and direct observation of dialogue (BAT, 2002 (a)). Verification and 
assurance contributed substantially to the overall cost. “The approximate value of the 
social reporting verification work by Bureau Veritas from May 2001 to May 2002 
was £650,000” (BAT, 2002 (a), p. 18). 
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Smoke Signals – Legitimacy 
BAT, together with the tobacco industry, is facing a crisis of legitimacy. “Perhaps no 
industry has been subjected to such serious erosion of its legitimacy as the tobacco 
industry” (Davidson, 1991, p. 49). Threatening BAT’s status as a legitimate 
organisation are the impending increased restrictions through the FCTC, with 
probable economic consequences; a nefarious public image to manage; as well as 
wider concerns about tobacco-related environmental issues. For the first time, the 
opposition to the tobacco industry is authoritative, credible and co-ordinated 
(Moerman and Van Der Laan, 2003). 
 
BAT’s motivation for the production of a social report could be a device in the 
legitimation process. Admittedly, Freedman and Stagliano (1992) have argued that 
there is no single motivation for making social disclosure and it is a function of the 
attitude of management towards their stakeholders. They suggest that the motivations 
may be economic or political or a reaction to user needs. This is the micro-level of 
analysis addressed in stakeholder theory. In contrast, the evidence suggests that 
BAT’s motivations are predominately political or at an abstract level to manage 
society’s perceptions. Social reporting provides a vehicle for BAT to enter the public 
policy arena. By moving from the traditional economic sphere, the report has 
provided BAT with a convenient platform in the social and political realm for ‘a 
voice’. This voice, however, has the capacity to dominate. This confirms the 
fundamental tenets of theories that emanate from the political economy paradigm by 
acknowledging the inseparability of economic and social issues. 
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The Smoking Gun 
BAT’s strategy is to effect legitimation through communication. This is consistent 
with the strategies Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) outline that organisations may adopt. 
BAT uses the report to contest critical issues, such as, the harmful health effects of 
environmental tobacco smoke and the statistics generated by WHO on future tobacco-
related mortality. BAT thereby attempts to alter the definition of social legitimacy to 
conform to its present practices, output and values (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). BAT 
has also, through the processes used to prepare the report (i.e. AA1000 framework, 
GRI guidelines and Bureau Veritas auditing), ‘identified’ the organisation with 
institutions, values and symbols that have a strong base in legitimacy (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975). By communicating an image, BAT is in fact constructing that image 
(Hines, 1988). This image is that of an organisation which operates in a controversial 
industry, but is committed to the principles of corporate social responsibility and 
capable of managing difficult social and environmental issues. 
 
There are several compelling signals emerging from the report, exposing its role as 
part of a broader legitimation process. It does not, and possibly cannot, deal with all 
‘relevant publics’. The report is produced as a stand-alone document, not aligned to 
mandated financial information, and thereby aimed at capturing an audience beyond 
the principal-agent accountability model. The report is equivocal and partial, not 
definitive and complete. And whereas it addresses some genuine concerns, such as 
under age smoking, significantly it ignores others, such as the actual harmful health 
effects of its products[6].  
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Whilst close scrutiny of the report exposes many contentious issues, it is critical to 
highlight several that epitomise the discretionary nature of the report. First, the report 
is selective. BAT proudly states that it operates in “180 countries” (BAT, 2002 (a), p. 
6) and yet only 13 countries as well as the UK “participated” in the process (BAT, 
2002 (a), p. 10) (see Appendix 1). These participating countries are dominated by 
Western industrialised nations where BAT has a corporate presence. The negative 
effects of the tobacco industry extend disproportionately to the unrepresented – 
‘undeveloped nations’. Therefore, the report cannot possibly be seen as complete and 
consequently a ‘true’ representation of BAT’s social interactions with the 
communities in which it operates. By giving voice to these participating countries, 
BAT effectively silences those that did not participate. Though the countries involved 
represent “a balanced spread across the Group’s geographic operating regions” (BAT, 
2002 (a), p. 10) they may not represent a balanced spread across the communities 
affected by BAT’s operations. Regional representation does not necessarily reflect 
economic, political or social equality. 
 
Second, the focus of the report is on ‘the process’. In adopting the AA1000 
framework, using the GRI guidelines, complemented by a process audit from Bureau 
Veritas, the report is effectively legitimised.  BAT selected the issues to be addressed 
in the process, which were “broadly validated” by the dialogue (BAT, 2002(a), p. 22) 
with the stakeholders who participated in the process. Essentially, BAT defined both 
the forum and the agenda for the report. 
 
Lastly, and possibly most saliently, is the matter of the verification. The independent 
verification of the report is seen as important both by BAT and the stakeholders 
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involved in the process. “We have learned that independent verification is of 
considerable value in assuring stakeholders that the process is objective and in helping 
to ensure consistency and quality of reporting across many different companies” 
(BAT, 2002 (a), p. 22). However this verification had a narrow scope - providing an 
ongoing review of Group companies’ adaptation and implementation of AA1000 and 
to verify that the information contained in the social report is a true and fair reflection 
of relevant Group companies’ activities and performance (BAT, 2002 (a)). Bureau 
Veritas verified the process for accuracy, ensuring it was derived using the AA1000 
(adapted) process, confirmed the base data by audit techniques and checked the 
accuracy and (or) source of numerical data. The ritual of auditing suggests the report 
presents a ‘true and fair’ view of BAT’s interactions with society. However, this audit 
process could not comment about whether the activities of the organisation were 
socially desirable as the scope was to verify process and form, not substance.  
 
This social reporting exercise has already rewarded BAT. The company’s inclusion 
on the Dow Jones Sustainable Group Index (DJSI) from November 2002 (SAM 
Indexes, 2002)[7] is a major coup for a company in an industry traditionally ‘black-
listed’ by ethical and socially responsible investors and funds. For inclusion, a 
significant weighting in the scoring process is placed on the quality and public 
availability of economic, environmental and social information (SAM, 2003). Two 
explanations for BAT’s achievement of a ‘score’ worthy of inclusion on the DJSI 
were cited by Lawrence (2002). First, the production of a social report and second, the 
involvement in workshops, conducted by Sustainable Asset Management[8], for 
companies wishing to improve their score. BAT’s legitimate status may be under 
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siege, but this listing will enhance its image significantly as it is now considered 
‘sustainable’ by the DJSI standards (Van Der Laan and Moerman, 2003).  
 
When the Smoke Clears 
BAT’s stated motivation for embarking on the process of corporate social reporting is 
to discharge a broader notion of accountability through stakeholder engagement. The 
motivation, rather than being in response to needs of stakeholders, is posited in this 
paper as a management strategy to forestall the introduction of more onerous 
regulation and to obfuscate or deflect poor social performance. Rather than a 
pluralistic view, where stakeholders are perceived as equally empowered (Tinker et 
al, 1991), BAT has used its position as a large multinational corporation to re-orient 
the debate.  In part, this relies on managing the perceptions of society through the 
social report by privileging certain issues and associating or identifying with 
institutions with a strong base of social legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975: 
Lindblom, 1993). This view is embraced in legitimacy theory.  
 
BAT is facing a legitimacy crisis, its equivocal and partial social report is an attempt 
to manage the situation by redefining the public policy agenda (Davidson, 1991). This 
masquerading of a public image campaign as an objective, broad-based discharge of 
accountability should be critiqued in light of the impending enhancement to 
international tobacco regulation and the many ‘relevant publics’ who are effectively 
silenced by this report. Further research will serve to confirm or redefine this 
assertion. The laudable purpose of producing a social report has been undermined by 
the less than subtle purpose of this document as the vehicle for the process of 
legitimation, an exercise in smoke and mirrors at its best! 
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1. Once 40 of the member states (192 in total) ratify, accept or approve the FCTC it is legally 
binding on those states and for every other state that ratifies, accepts or approves from that 
point. 
2. The cost of the 2001/2002 Social Report is estimated by BAT to be £3 million (BAT, 2002 
(b)) 
3. The social, political and historical implications of this issue are acknowledged, but are not 
within the ambit of this paper. 
4. The question of which occupational group will be granted or gain authority over this process 
is still unresolved. 
5. In 2002 the GRI guidelines were revised and updated however the 2000 guidelines were 
current in BAT’s 2001/2002 Social Report. 
6. The GRI Category Products and Services is operationalised by aspect 6.95 which is concerned 
with the major social issues and impacts associated with the use of principal products and 
services (GRI, 2000, p. 35). This aspect is omitted in the Social Report 2001/2002. 
7. For information on companies which are included on this index and the screening methods 
employed refer to http://www.sustainability-indexes.com/
8. Sustainable Asset Management (SAM) are the group responsible for producing the DJSI.
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APPENDIX 1 
STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE 
 FIRST PARTICIPATING GROUP COMPANIES 
 
As well as overview reporting by 
British American Tobacco p.l.c., our process 
involves dialogue and reporting by Group 
companies around the world. Companies in 
13 countries in addition to the UK have taken 
part in the first cycle and more will join over 
time. The initial countries were mainly 
chosen by the external CSR consultancy EQ 
Management and represent a balanced spread 
across the Group’s geographic operating 
regions. 
Africa and the Middle East: 
South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe 
 
America-Pacific: 
USA 
 
Asia-Pacific: 
Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
 
Europe: 
Germany, Hungary, Russia 
 
Latin America and Caribbean: 
Argentina, Brazil 
 
British American Tobacco (2002), Social Report 2001/2002, p.10
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APPENDIX 2 
 
STAKEHOLDER GROUPS INVITED TO/ATTENDING ONE OR 
MORE UK DIALOGUE SESSIONS 
Stakeholder Category Invited Attended % of 
Invitees 
Attended 
Business ethics and socially responsible 
investment 
32 13 41% 
Medical organisations 24 4 17% 
Youth, women, family organisations 14 2 14% 
Education 7 0 0%
Community, welfare, religious 13 1 8% 
Overseas development, environment 12 1 8% 
Retail, consumer 15 1 7% 
Business, trade 10 5 50% 
Trade Unions 6 3 50%
Government, political committees, 
political parties 
19 2 11% 
Marketing, film, broadcasting 11 2 18% 
Research organisations and think tanks 3 0 0%
Anti-tobacco groups 1 0 0%
TOTAL 167 34 20% 
British American Tobacco (2002), Social Report 2001/2002, p.122
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APPENDIX 3 
 
COMPONENTS OF GRI –  SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES 
CATEGORIES  
 
ECONOMIC 
 
Profit Intangible Assets Investments 
Wages and Benefits Labour Productivity Taxes 
Community Development Suppliers Products and Services 
SOCIAL 
 
Workplace Suppliers Products & Services 
Human Rights 
ENVIRONMENTAL  
Energy Suppliers Land Use / Biodiversity 
Materials Transport Compliance 
Water Products & Services Emissions, Effluents, and 
Waste 
Global Reporting Initiative (2000), Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.
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APPENDIX 4 
COMPONENTS OF GRI –  SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES 
CATEGORIES REPORTED BY BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 
 
SOCIAL 
 
Workplace Suppliers Human Rights 
ENVIRONMENTAL  
Energy Suppliers Land Use / Biodiversity 
Materials Transport Compliance 
Water Products & Services Emissions, Effluents, and 
Waste 
British American Tobacco (2002 (a)), Social Report 2001/2002.
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